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1. Introduction 
 In a riskless world, choosing an occupation should be, undoubtedly, an easy 
task. In such a case, individuals can make their choice just maximizing the earnings 
across occupations. However, in a risky world like ours, where the fact that workers 
are averse to fluctuations in their incomes is universally recognised, such a decision 
becomes much more complicated. Such a fluctuations in earnings is what we call 
earnings risk. 
Economic theory suggests that if these risks are foreseeable, they should be 
compensated for. In the empirical literature on compensating wage differentials there 
exist a wide variety of studies analysing the effect of different sources of risk in the 
job place on wages. However, this literature is mainly focused on injury or fatality 
risks. As Adam Smith we claim that in a competitive labour market there must exist a 
way of compensation in those occupations that entail a higher probability of failure 
(higher variance in earnings) in order to attract sufficient supply. While uncertainty in 
labour income is accounted for in most theoretical models it has been rarely tested 
apart from some exceptions in the US. 
Additionally, there is also a growing literature that shows the relevance of the 
skewness of the returns in many economic decisions. For example, Garret and Sobel 
(1999) and Golec and Tamarking (1998) find evidence that risk-averse individuals 
playing lottery games and betting in horse races in the US base their participation 
decision on the skewness of the prize distributions, respectively. Prackash et al. 
(2003) found empirical evidence from Latin American, US and European capital 
markets that investors do trade expected return of the portfolio for skewness. Diaz-
Serrano (2004) empirically supports that positive skewness favour homeownership in 
Germany and Spain. And Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) in the US and Diaz-Serrano, 
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Hartog and Nielsen (2004) in Denmark shows that individuals appreciate positively 
skewed income distributions, and they incorporate this information into their 
educational choices. In this paper, we empirically test for the Spanish labor market 
whether risk-averse workers are compensated for earnings risks in their occupational 
choices, and whether there is a willingness to pay for positive skewness in their 
incomes.  
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the existing 
literature in this issue is extensively reviewed. Section 3 presents the theoretical 
background. In section 4 we describe the empirical framework. In section 5 we 
describe the dataset. We carry out the empirical analysis in section 6. And section 7 
summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
In labour economics there is a growing literature dealing with earnings risk 
and its effects on individuals’ behaviour in the labour market. This literature considers 
three different approaches, the effect of risk on the human capital investment, on the 
occupational choices, and on the compensating wage differentials.  
 
2.1. Earnings risk and schooling choices 
Levhari and Weiss (1974) built a two period model with the choice between 
working or studying during the first period, and stochastic earnings during the second 
period for those who attended education in the first period. In their theoretical model 
they obtain that increasing earnings risk reduces the investment in education. Kodde 
(1986) built on Levhari and Weiss model’: in his theoretical model he finds an 
ambiguous effect, but his empirical estimation suggests increasing demand for 
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education with increasing risk. Snow and Warren (1990) found that human capital 
decreases with increasing risk in its future returns if such investment is an inferior 
activity and individuals exhibit decreasing risk aversion. 
Williams (1979) applied dynamic programming to the education decisions, 
where production and depreciation of human capital and future wages are all 
stochastic. He concludes, under conditions, that higher risk in the production of 
human capital reduces investment in schooling. Belzil and Hansen (2002) and Hogan 
and Walker (2002) also used the dynamic programming framework, both models find 
that individuals prefer to stay at school longer with increasing risk in future earnings. 
The first argue that it is because while being at school they receive non risky parental 
income, the second attribute this result to the increased value of waiting for a good 
earnings draw.  
 The work of Hartog and Diaz-Serrano (2002) constitutes one of the few 
empirical studies on this issue. They develop a human capital model for optimum 
schooling length with stochastic earnings and highlight the pivotal role of risk 
attitudes and the schooling gradient of earnings risk. Their empirical estimation uses 
Spanish data on high school graduates deciding on attending university education. 
They find that the basic response to increasing earnings risk is negative but that in 
households with lower risk aversion, the response will be dampened substantially and 
may even be reversed to positive.  
 
2.2. Occupational choices 
Orazem and Mattila (1986) developed an empirical model of occupational 
choice under uncertainty. They considered the first two moments of the earnings 
distribution (mean and variance) within various alternative occupations. Their 
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empirical results confirm that increasing mean and decreasing variance of the earnings 
distribution increase the probability of choosing a given occupation. Siow (1984) 
estimated supply curves assuming uncertainty in the future wages and tenure of the 
occupational choice by a cohort of entrants into an occupation. This author used a 
sample of American lawyers. De Meza (1984) also analysed occupational choices 
under wage uncertainty, this author finds that increasing risk decreases individual’s 
utility. 
 
2.3. Risk compensation in wages 
This literature starts with King (1974) using aggregated data regressed the 
variance and the skewness by occupation cells on average earnings, observing a 
positive effect for variance and negative for skewness in the US labour market. 
McGoldrick (1995) built on King’s work and using US microdata obtained the same 
results. McGoldrick and Robst (1996) studied the effect of workers mobility on 
compensating differentials for earnings risk. They observe that workers with high 
mobility receive smaller compensations for earnings risk, since they show preference 
for uncertain situations. Also in the context of the US labour market, Feinberg (1981a) 
estimated significant wage compensation for earnings risk using a 6-years panel. He 
estimated earnings-risk as the coefficient of variation of individual yearly earnings 
during the sample period. And Feinberg (1981b) also finds that workers experiencing 
employment instability in their occupations are compensated for.  
Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) were the first to provide a formal modelling on 
risk compensation in wages. Using US data they estimated structural equations 
measuring risk and skewness by occupation-education cells, and they observe a 
positive compensation for risk and a penalty for skewness in wages. Diaz-Serrano, 
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Hartog and Nielsen (2003) also estimated positive compensation for risk using Danish 
panel data. They estimated risk using just education cells and provide new estimates 
by experimenting with several dynamic measures of earnings risk and skewness. They 
also found a significant positive effect of the variance and negative for the skewness 
on wages.  
 
3. Theoretical background 
As we mention in the previous section, there is a wide number of studies that 
considers an effect of earnings uncertainty in the educational an occupational choices. 
However, a little has been said yet about skewness. Tsiang (1974) found theoretical 
support that risk-averse individuals display preference for skewness, in addition to 
aversion to dispersion (risk), of the probability distribution of the returns in economic 
decisions that entail an uncertain outcome. This result suggests that since increasing 
absolute risk aversion is absurd, decreasing absolute risk aversion requires that 
individuals appreciate higher moments as e.g. skewness. Other well established 
theories also emphasize around this finding. For example, prospect theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979, 1991) states that the individual’s disutility caused by a loss is 
greater than the utility caused by a gain of the same size, which goes in the same 
direction as Tsiang’s findings. These arguments suggest that if we assume future 
earnings attached to an occupational/educational choice to be uncertain, both the 
variance and skewness of earnings, in addition to the mean, should be considered 
when analyzing how these choices are planned and achieved.  
 To understand how such a compensation mechanism in wages may arise we 
follow Hartog and Vijvenberg (2002) and Diaz-Serrano et al. (2004). Assume that a risk-
averse individual has to choose between two occupational options that only differ in risk. 
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In the riskless alternative, annual earnings are given as Yf , generating utility U(Yf ), where 
U( ) is a concave utility function with U’ > 0, U” < 0 and U’” > 0 (the latter condition is 
necessary for declining absolute risk aversion, see Tsiang, 1974 or Hartog and Vijverberg, 
2002). In the risky option, income is a single draw for the rest of working life, written as 
Yr+ε. Equal expected lifetime utility requires 
0 0
( ) ( )
T Tt t
f rU Y e dt E U Y e dt
ρ ρε− −= +∫ ∫  (1) 
where T is the length of working life and ρ the time discount rate. We can write the left-
hand side as  
( )0 1( ) 1 ( )T t Tf fU Y e dt e U Yρ ρρ− −= −∫  (2) 
For the stochastic term on the right-hand side we apply a third-order Taylor expansion 
around the expected value rY , one order up from Pratt’s original contribution (Pratt, 
1964), to  
( ) 2 30 1 1 1( ) 1 ( ) ''( ) '''( )2 6T t Tr r r p r pU Y e dt e U Y U Y U Yρ ρε σ κρ− − ⎡ ⎤+ = − + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  
(3)
where 2pσ  is the second moment (risk) and 2pκ  is the third moment (skewness) of ε 
around the expected value zero. Equating (2) and (3) and rewriting a little, after applying 
a first-order Taylor expansion around rY  for (2), we get 
2 3 2 3
2 3 2 3
1 '' 1 ''' '' 1 1
2 ' 6 '' ' 2 6
r f p p p p
r r r r s r
r r r r r
Y Y U U UY Y Y V V V
Y U U UY Y Y Y
σ κ σ κ− = − − = −  (4)
where Vr is Arrow-Pratt’s relative risk aversion and Vs is the similar definition for relative 
skewness affection (we call it affection, because individuals like skewness; see Hartog 
and Vijverberg, 2002). With Vr and Vs positive by definition, we note from (4) that 
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individuals only enter an occupation if the permanent effect from an unknown 
occupational outcome is matched by a positive premium for the risk (variance), while 
they allow an earnings drop for skewness. 
  
3. Empirical framework 
Assume that earnings of an individual can be expressed as follows 
 
isj s ijY Yη= , (5)
 
where Yisj are the observed earnings of individual i with education S in occupation j, 
Ys=µsY0 are the expected earnings of an individual with education level S, with 
Y0=exp(Xβ), and ηij=exp(uij) is a term picking up specific effects on earnings of 
individuals’ occupation. This specification allows individuals with the same schooling 
to earn different wages. Appling logarithms in both sides of (5) we get 
 
log logij s i ijY X uµ β= + + , (6)
 
where X are the observable determinants of Yij, logµs is the fixed effect of education 
on wages, and uij is the effect on wages of occupation j for individual i. Expression (6) 
provides the familiar Mincer mark-up model. If wages include a compensation for risk 
in labour earnings, uij can be decomposed as follows 
2 3
ij j j j iu uλ ασ γκ= + + + , (7)
 
where λj are the occupation fixed-effects, 2jσ  is the variance of earnings within 
occupations, 3jκ  is the skewness, and ui is a random term normally distributed with 0 
mean and constant variance across individuals. By substituting (7) in (6), the complete 
specification of individuals’ earnings can be expressed as 
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2 3log logi s j i j j iY X uµ λ β ασ γκ= + + + + + , (8)
 
The existence of a risk compensation requires α>0, whereas the so called 
“skewness affection” that entails a penalty in wages requires γ<0. We take as suitable 
measures of 2jσ  (hereafter Rj) and 3jκ  (hereafter Kj) the variance and the skewness of 
the observed earnings by occupations cells, respectively.  
We decompose earnings according to the source of variation, i.e. systematic 
and unsystematic component. Systematic fluctuations in earnings are caused by 
supply variables (e.g. human capital), which are usually known by individuals, and 
therefore, have nothing to do with risk. However, unsystematic variations in earnings 
catch variations which are unknown by individuals when they have to make their 
choice of education and ensuing occupation. They reflect indeed the risk to the 
individual: their as yet unknown abilities, suitability for her job, and hence relative 
position in the occupations’ earnings distribution. They also reflect demand factors 
(e.g. business cycle or shocks in output demand) and they are expected to generate 
compensating wage differentials. Hence, suitable measures of risk and skewness in 
wages require that systematic variation in wages shall be purged from observed 
earnings, since otherwise the true relationship between risk and wages might be 
obscured. 
We use a two-step method to test for risk compensation in the earnings 
equation (8). Firstly, we estimate equation (6), where we assume that log s iXµ β+  
collects the systematic variation in earnings, and hence the estimated residuals are 
used to calculate R and K by occupations as follows 
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{ }2ˆ ˆ( )j j ij j ijR E Eη η= −  
{ }3ˆ ˆ( )j j ij j ijK E Eη η= −  
(9)
(10)
 
where ˆ ˆexp( )ij ijuη =  and the exponential transformation on the estimated residuals ˆiju  
is applied in order to transfer unsystematic earnings back to the money metric. And 
secondly, the estimates of Rj and Kj obtained in the first round are plugged in the wage 
equation (8). One might expect the occupation fixed-effects λj in expression (7) to be 
known by individuals, and hence, we calculate risk and skewness around the 
occupational mean. However, we cannot include the occupation fixed effects in the 
second round, as we have already fixed R and K for given occupation. The 
interpretation of α in equation (8) is the amount of extra wages that an individual 
requires for an additional unit of risk. By analogy to α, γ is the amount of wage that 
an individual is willing to pay for an additional unit of positive skewness.  
 
4. Data description 
To carry out the empirical analysis we use a sample of the Family Budget 
Survey 1990 (Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares 1990 – EPF/90). The EPF/90 is a 
nationwide representative survey, which is designed with the aim of updating the list 
of goods and services acquired by Spanish households. It is used in the estimation of 
private consumption, and the elaboration of the Consumption Prices Index, and also to 
reveal the expenditures and the earnings of the Spanish households. The survey also 
provides information about individual annual earnings. In the EPF/90, 21,150 
households are surveyed. The file on individual information has a sample size of 
78,273 observations, among whose 18,132 are wage earners working in either the 
private or the public sector. In our empirical estimation of the reduced form wage 
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equations we select salaried males and females, aged between 18 and 65, and working 
in either the public or the private sector. This selection provides a sample of salaried 
workers of 17,919 individuals. Table 1 provides descriptive sample statistics of some 
selected variables used in our empirical estimations. 
 
Insert table 1 here 
 
5. Empirical results 
In this section we present the empirical results derived from the OLS estimates 
of the wage equation (8). We use as endogenous variable the workers’ gross yearly 
wages1. We run regressions for the full sample of salaried workers, and also separate 
estimations for males and females, and for public and private sector employees. We 
also use the standard methods to control for selectivity bias, the well-known 
Heckman’s (1976) method for the females’ wage equation and Lee (1983)2 for public-
private sector employees’ wage equations. 
In table 2 we report the results of the choice equation for female participation 
in the labour market used to correct for selectivity bias in female wages. Women who 
                                                 
1 The EPF/90 provides net annual earnings, however, we proxy gross earnings by transforming from 
net earnings using the tax rates for different wage levels and family sizes and the corresponding social 
security payments. 
2 Assume that wages in public and the private sector are determined by the following linear relationship 
, ,log k i k k i k iW X uα β= + +  , where the subscript k denotes public or private If we define Yki as the 
unobserved propensity of individual i to work in sector k (public or private), this unobserved propensity 
can be expressed as a linear function of the individual’s and the demand’s observed characteristics as 
kiikkki ZY εγδ ++= . Taking expectations on wages condition to the choice of the sector k we get 
)|()|(log kuEXkWE iikki ++= βα . Selectivity exists if E(ui | k) ≠ 0, i.e. when assignment to a given 
sector is not random. Defining the probability of being employed in sector k as 
exp( ) / exp( )ki k k i k k iP Z Zδ γ δ γ= + +∑ , then the conditional expectation on the right hand side can be 
expressed as E(ui|k)=πkλik, where { }1( ) /ik ik ikP Pλ φ −= Φ , and φ and Φ-1 denote the standard univariate 
normal density and the inverse normal distribution function, respectively. Hence, the full specification 
with selectivity bias correction now reads as 
ikikkikkik XW ελφβα +++=log . 
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are more educated, married, and living in urban areas are more likely to participate in 
the labour market, whereas the opposite holds for older women and women with 
children. Table 3 shows the results of the choice equation between public and private 
employees used to correct for selectivity bias in the public-private sector wage 
equations. More educated, younger, married, urban and more skilled workers are more 
likely to be employed in the private sector, whereas men and workers with children 
are more likely to be employees in the public sector.  
 
Insert table 2 here 
Insert table 3 here 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the estimation of equation (6) for the selected 
workforce groups. As variables expected to generate systematic variations in earnings 
we consider years of schooling, a cubic polynomial on potential years of experience, 
and dummies for gender, region and urbanisation. Explanatory variables are highly 
significant (at 1% level or better), and behave according to expectations. Returns to 
schooling are greater for women than for men, whereas this result is reversed for 
returns to experience. Wages also tend to be higher in urban areas for all selected 
workforce groups. Differences in the returns to schooling and to experience between 
public and private employees are fairly modest, whereas wage differentials by gender 
and urbanizations are significantly smaller in the public than in the private sector. The 
selectivity bias correction term is very significant in the split public-private sector 
wage equations. However, although the choice model for female participation has 
reported significant effects for a number of exogenous variables, surprisingly the 
correction term has turned out to be immaterial. Differences in the estimated 
parameters between corrected and uncorrected specification are negligible. 
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Insert table 4 here 
 
In table 5 we show summary statistics of the estimations of Rj (risk) and Kj 
(skewness). A first look allows us to observe that risk and skewness possess enough 
variability to seek for effects in the wage equation (8). Risk and skewness tend to be 
greater for men and private sector employees than for women and public workers, 
increasing with age and decreasing with education. The Commerce, Agriculture, 
Construction and Transport industries offer riskier wage distributions than the 
manufacturing and banking industries. In general, occupations that require a greater 
degree of skills (managers and qualified workers) also offer riskier wages.  
 
Insert table 5 here 
 
We present our key results on risk compensation in table 6, for the sake of 
simplicity we just show the results for the effects of schooling, risk and skewness. We 
use three different specifications for equation (8): excluding R and K, excluding K 
and including R and K. In all these specifications we use the coefficient associated to 
the returns to schooling to evaluate the sensitivity or potential omitted-variable bias of 
this coefficient to the omission of risk and skewness. Our results allow us to reject the 
existence of bias due to risk omission in the rate of returns to schooling. The complete 
specification of equation (8) also considers a cubic polynomial on years of experience, 
and additive dummies for gender, family status, geographical location, industry, and 
some broad occupational-skill groups. The latter set of dummies allows us to capture 
the fixed-effect of these skill groups.  
 
Insert table 6 here 
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Our results allow us to conclude that risk-averse workers are compensated for 
earnings risk, i.e. significant and positive sign for R, and penalised for positive 
skewness, i.e. significant and negative for K. This result persists across alternative 
samples and specifications. It is also worth noting that the risk coefficients have 
shown a great sensitivity to the inclusion/omission of skewness. Economic 
significance of the coefficients is assessed by the elasticities in italic letters. These 
results suggest that risk compensation and skewness penalty are greater for women 
than for men. For men, with a 10% increase in risk and skewness, wages are raised 
about 0.25% and penalized about 0.1%. For women, these numbers are 0.36% and 
1%, respectively. Between public and private employees we also find marked 
differentials in the risk compensation, a 10% increase in risk raises wages about 
0.86% for public employees, whereas for their counterparts in the private sector 
wages increase only about 0.18%. An equivalent increment in skewness depresses 
wages about 0.9% and 0.12% for public and private employees, respectively.  
 
6. Summary and concluding remarks 
 In this study we report the existence of compensating wage differentials for 
earnings risk in the Spanish labour market. The existence of such a risk compensation 
for different workforce groups reveals that the finding is quite robust. Our results are 
also consistent with previous evidence for the US and Denmark. From these results 
we conclude that the risk-return trade-off across occupations is well established and is 
consistent with the preferences of risk/averse agents with declining absolute risk 
aversion. Our results also suggest that women and public sector employees are more 
risk-averse than men and their counterparts in the private sector. These results also fit 
within previous evidence for the US that shows increasing probability to be employed 
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in the public sector with increasing individual risk-aversion (see Belante and Link, 
1981) and in with the evidence that women are more risk averse than men and hence, 
require higher compensation for risk (see McGoldrick, 1995 and Schubert et al., 
1999).  
We recognize that as in Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) and Diaz-Serrano, 
Hartog and Nielsen (2004), structural estimates and measures catching the dynamic 
nature of risk would provide a more suitable framework. However, the required long 
and rich panel data sets are rarely available for most of the countries. Hence, further 
research in this line is encouraged. 
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Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics 
 Full sample Women Men Public sector Private sector 
 Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
Age 37,14 12,09 34,03 11,40 38,54 12,14 39,10 11,48 36,46 12,23
Women 0,31 0,46 0,38 0,49 0,29 0,45
Married 0,36 0,48 0,31 0,46 0,38 0,48 0,41 0,49 0,34 0,47
Household size 4,14 1,54 4,02 1,57 4,19 1,52 3,93 1,51 4,22 1,54
# of children 0,57 0,50 0,52 0,50 0,59 0,49 0,55 0,50 0,58 0,49
Years of schooling 8,39 4,29 9,21 4,40 8,03 4,19 10,78 4,65 7,56 3,83
Log(yearly wages) 13,87 0,83 13,55 0,89 14,01 0,75 14,19 0,74 13,76 0,83
Dummies industry    
Agriculture 0,08 0,26 0,05 0,21 0,09 0,28 0,01 0,12 0,10 0,30
Energy 0,02 0,14 0,00 0,07 0,03 0,16 0,02 0,14 0,02 0,14
Chemical 0,03 0,17 0,01 0,11 0,04 0,20 0,02 0,13 0,04 0,19
Mechanics 0,08 0,26 0,02 0,14 0,10 0,30 0,02 0,13 0,10 0,29
Other manufactures 0,13 0,33 0,13 0,34 0,12 0,33 0,01 0,11 0,16 0,37
Construction 0,10 0,30 0,01 0,11 0,14 0,35 0,02 0,14 0,13 0,34
Commerce 0,16 0,37 0,19 0,39 0,15 0,35 0,02 0,12 0,21 0,41
Transport 0,06 0,23 0,03 0,16 0,07 0,26 0,08 0,28 0,05 0,22
Banking 0,05 0,22 0,05 0,21 0,05 0,22 0,01 0,10 0,06 0,24
Other services 0,30 0,46 0,51 0,50 0,21 0,41 0,79 0,40 0,13 0,34
Dummies occupation    
Managerial 0,01 0,10 0,00 0,05 0,01 0,12 0,01 0,10 0,01 0,10
Professionals 0,09 0,29 0,13 0,33 0,08 0,27 0,23 0,42 0,04 0,20
Scientists 0,07 0,26 0,11 0,31 0,05 0,23 0,12 0,33 0,05 0,22
Technicians 0,13 0,33 0,20 0,40 0,09 0,29 0,19 0,39 0,10 0,31
Clerical 0,21 0,41 0,37 0,48 0,14 0,34 0,16 0,37 0,23 0,42
Qualified workers 0,06 0,24 0,00 0,07 0,08 0,28 0,04 0,18 0,07 0,25
Clerical 0,08 0,28 0,01 0,11 0,12 0,32 0,05 0,22 0,10 0,30
Manual workers 0,33 0,47 0,18 0,38 0,39 0,49 0,14 0,35 0,39 0,49
Other 0,02 0,14 0,00 0,07 0,03 0,16 0,06 0,24 0,01 0,08
Public workers 0,26 0,44 0,32 0,46 0,23 0,42  
Dummies location    
Urban area 0,58 0,49 0,62 0,49 0,56 0,50 0,70 0,46 0,53 0,50
Region 1 0,40 0,49 0,39 0,49 0,40 0,49 0,40 0,49 0,40 0,49
Region 2 0,37 0,48 0,37 0,48 0,37 0,48 0,40 0,49 0,36 0,48
Region 3 0,23 0,42 0,24 0,43 0,23 0,42 0,20 0,40 0,24 0,43
Sample size 18132 5620 12512 4675 13457 
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Table 2: Probit estimates for female participation 
 Coefficient      Z-stat  
Constant 
Primary education 
Secondary education 
Higher education 
Age 
Age square 
Children 
Married 
Number of wage earners 
Urban area 
-3.6399       (-18.6)
0.1565           (2.5)
0.3684           (8.4)
1.0198           (4.3)
0.1098           (8.7)
-0.0016         (-6.8)
-0.2909         (-4.7) 
0.3725          (7.1)
0.5089          (3.8)
0.1374           (4.2)
0 – Non-participant 
1 – Participant 
15569 
5620 
Sample size 21189 
Notes: Endogenous variable is female participation.  
Estimates include dummies for region. 
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Table 3: Probit estimates for public-private sector choice 
Coefficient        Z-stat 
Intercept 
Primary education 
Secondary education 
Higher education 
Actually studying 
Age 
Age square 
Female 
Children 
Married 
Urban 
Region 1 
Region 3 
Scientists 
Professionals 
Operators 
Administrative 
White-collars 
Blue-collars 
-4.1242         (-16.1) 
0.3698             (4.6) 
  0.9197           (10.1) 
 1.6174           (16.0) 
 0.4602             (6.5) 
0.0998             (7.9) 
-0.0008            (-7.3) 
 0.2351             (7.4) 
-0.1505            (-3.4) 
 0.1630             (3.7) 
 0.2127             (7.1) 
 0.0728             (1.6) 
-0.4938           (-9.7) 
 0.5552             (6.1) 
 0.1760             (2.1) 
 0.1258             (1.6) 
-0.3535           (-4.8) 
-0.6774           (-7.4) 
-0.9382         (-13.0) 
Public sector 
Private sector 
  4675  
13417 
Sample size 18092 
         Note: Endogenous variable is working in the private sector. 
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Table 4: OLS and two-step estimates of equation (2) used to purge systematic earnings. 
 Full sample Males Females Females1 Public2 
 
Private2
Constant 
 
 
Schooling 
 
 
Exp. 
 
 
Exp. square 
 
 
Exp. cube 
 
 
Female 
 
 
Urban 
 
 
Region 1 
 
 
Region 3 
 
 
Correction term 
 
12.2383
(397.8)
0.0969
(71.1)
0.0757
(18.2)
-0.0014
(-7.2)
6.4·10-6
(2.5)
-0.4507
(-41.2)
0.1319
(12.6)
-0.0937
(-8.2)
0.1044
(7.9)
12.1515
(334.6)
0.0849
(57.8)
0.0937
(18.9)
-0.0018
(-8.1)
8.9·10-6
(3.1)
0.1374
(11.9)
-0.0963
(-7.6)
0.1105
(7.5)
11.6686
(212.2)
0.1182
(44.3)
0.0843
(11.3)
-0.0025
(-6.7)
2.6·10-5
(4.9)
0.1274
(6.1)
-0.0872
(-3.8)
0.1052
(4.1)
11.6906
(103.7)
0.1198
(41.1)
0.0835
(11.1)
-0.0025
(-6.7)
2.5·10-5
(4.9)
0.1293
(6.2)
-0.0860
(-3.7)
0.1079
(4.2)
-0.0403
(-1.3)
13.0405 
(110.1) 
 
0.0658 
(17.5) 
 
0.0736 
(10.4) 
 
-0.0017 
(-7.4) 
 
1.4·10-5 
(3.4) 
 
-0.3178 
(-17.9) 
 
0.1263 
(6.2) 
 
-0.0829 
(-4.2) 
 
0.1147 
(4.6) 
 
-0.2856 
(-7.1) 
12.4335
(328.0)
0.0675
(24.8)
0.0613
(12.3)
-0.0011
(-4.8)
2.6·10-6
(0.8)
-0.5673
(-42.4)
0.1268
(10.4)
-0.1006
(-7.4)
0.2034
(12.2)
0.3992
(9.9)
Sample size 17919 12512 5251 5251 4675 13457
Notes: (1) Heckman’s selectivity correction 
            (2) Lee’s selectivity correction 
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Table 5: Summary statistics for estimated R (risk) and K (skewness). 
           Risk                Skewness 
 Mean STD Mean STD 
Total 0.631 0.867 3.502 3.140 
Industry     
Agriculture 0.804 0.897 5.608 1.421 
Energy 0.561 0.333 2.681 1.838 
Chemical 0.588 0.887 2.255 1.999 
Mechanics 0.500 0.935 2.653 1.952 
Other manufactures 0.660 0.774 3.493 3.331 
Construction 0.801 0.424 8.096 4.493 
Commerce 0.809 1.506 2.976 1.810 
Transport 0.791 0.549 4.100 2.959 
Banking 0.492 0.694 2.529 1.811 
Other services 0.457 0.505 2.143 2.070 
Education     
Incomplete primary 0.666 0.572 4.973 3.738 
Primary 0.678 0.835 3.955 3.421 
Secondary 0.602 1.057 2.971 2.247 
University 0.484 0.816 1.690 1.361 
Job level     
Managerial 0.782 0.463 1.380 0.974 
Professionals 0.421 0.094 1.284 0.453 
Scientists 0.600 0.346 1.907 1.750 
Technicians 0.419 0.024 3.081 1.230 
Clerical 0.597 0.663 2.601 2.051 
Qualified workers 1.813 2.807 5.840 2.683 
Clerical 0.455 0.117 3.280 1.516 
Manual workers 0.649 0.482 5.046 4.215 
Other 0.240 0.151 1.153 0.487 
Age     
18 to 25 0.600 0.541 3.424 3.009 
25 to 35 0.624 0.846 3.386 3.045 
35 to 45 0.645 1.003 3.461 3.157 
45 to 55 0.643 0.898 3.751 3.376 
55 to 65 0.665 1.062 3.699 3.213 
Sector     
Private 0.685 0.952 3.853 3.281 
Public 0.476 0.525 2.492 2.427 
Gender     
Men 0.676 0.974 3.993 3.418 
Women 0.532 0.550 2.409 2.019 
 23
Table 6: Estimation of returns to schooling, returns to risk and skewness penalty for several workforce groups1. (t-statistics in parenthesis) 
 Full sample Males Females Public2 
 
Private2 
Intercept 
 
 
Schooling 
 
 
Risk 
 
 
 
Skewness 
 
 
 
Correction term 
 
12.4281 
(227.6) 
 
0.0686 
(37.3) 
12.4140 
(227.5) 
 
0.0682 
(37.1) 
 
0.0377 
(6.3) 
 
 
 
12.4250
(226.0)
0.0679
(36.8)
0.0390
(6.5)
0.0199
-0.0027
(-2.7)
-0.0096
12.4033
(212.8)
0.0610
(30.3)
0.0401
(6.8)
12.4221
(213.1)
0.0601
(29.7)
0.0424
(7.4)
0.0246
-0.0045
(-2.8)
-0.0155
11.5004 
(154.3) 
 
0.0784 
(19.4) 
 
0.0140 
(1.5) 
 
 
11.8744
(110.9)
0.0783
(19.4)
0.0528
(4.2)
0.0359
-0.0527
(-4.8)
-0.1012
13.5375
(67.4)
0.0531
(8.8)
0.0127
(0.4)
-0.3270
(-3.8)
13.5005
(61.5)
0.0513
(8.5)
0.2330
(3.2)
0.0862
-0.0890
(-3.4)
-0.0898
-0.3403
(-4.0)
12.2944
(116.5)
0.0525
(16.9)
0.0240
(7.3)
0.3288
(4.5)
12.3326
(116.1)
0.0521
(16.8)
0.0278
(7.9)
0.0181
-0.0063
(-3.0)
-0.0119
0.3273
(4.5)
Sample size 17919 12512 5251 4675 13457 
Notes: (1) Full model specification includes a cubic polynomial on years of experience, and dummy controls for gender, family status, geographical, industry 
and occupations 
            (2) Lee’s selectivity correction 
 
 
